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Abstract 
This paper carries out a comprehensive analysis of renewable energy innovations considering four mechanisms 
suggested by innovation models: 1. policy-inducement; 2. market structure; 3. demand and social cohesion- 
mainly proxied by income inequality; 4. characteristics of country knowledge base. For OECD countries and 
years 1970-2005, we build a unique dataset containing time-varying information on quality-adjusted patent 
production in renewable energy, the latter being a function of environmental policies, green R&D, entry barriers, 
knowledge stock, knowledge diversity and income inequality. We develop count data models using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to account for endogeneity of policy support. Our synthetic policy 
index positively affects innovations especially in countries with deregulated energy markets and low entry 
barriers. The effect of entry barriers and inequality is negative and of similar magnitude as that of policy. 
Product market liberalization positively affects green patent generation, especially so when ambitious policies 
are adopted, when the initial level of public R&D expenditures and when the initial share of distributed energy 
generation is high. Our results are robust to alternative specifications, to the inclusion of technology-specific 
effects and to the use of quality-adjusted patents as dependent variables. In the latter case, the estimated effect of 
lowering entry barriers and of knowledge diversity almost double on citation count relatively to patent count.          
 
JEL Codes : Q55, Q58, Q42, Q48, O34. 
Keywords: Renewable energy technology, patent, environmental policies, product market regulation, 
inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation is commonly regarded as the best answer to sustaining current life standards while 
overcoming severe environmental concerns. This is especially relevant in the case of energy, where 
increasing resource scarcity calls for the rapid development of alternative energy sources, notably 
renewable energy. Although as of today, renewable energy cannot compete with fossil fuel in terms of 
production costs; impressive technological progress has paved the way to new promising sources such 
as biomass, solar and wind, among others.3Countries too have developed areas of specialization in 
specific types of renewable energy sources: For example, Denmark has established a strong 
technological advantage in wind technologies, Sweden and Germany have specialized in bioenergy, 
Germany and Spain in solar, Norway and Austria in Hydropower.  
In addressing the issue of how technological advantages emerged for renewable energy, the economic 
literature emphasizes the key role of public policies in fostering environmental innovation. Moving 
from these premises, assessing the effects of targeted environmental policies and/or energy prices on 
environmental innovations has been the main goal of most empirical research (Jaffe et al. 2003). For 
instance, guaranteed price schemes and investment incentives appear to have a major role in the early 
phase of technological development, whereas for relatively more mature technologies, i.e. wind, 
obligations and quantity-based instruments appear to be more effective policy tools. (Johnstone, 
Haščič and Popp 2010,  JHP henceforth). 
Remarkably less attention has been devoted to the quantification of  these inducement mechanisms, 
first when policies are endogenously determined and second when other institutional factors are 
considered.  On the latter point, the most important institutional change has been the liberalization of 
the energy sector common to several countries. This process has had a substantial impact on the 
market structure of the sector of energy, possible altering the incentive mechanism for developing 
innovation (e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt 2008). In fact, the effect of liberalization on innovation is 
presumably undetermined: if more competitive markets lower the appropriability of R&D investments, 
an increase in competition in the energy sector should lower the incentive for innovation. Conversely, 
more competitive markets may yield greater incentives of investing in R&D in order to escape the 
increased competition (Aghion et al. 2001). Besides, entry of new players may have spurred 
innovation as renewable energy involves decentralized energy generation (DG), smaller scale of 
production and competences far from those of existing incumbents. 
On the former point, the approval of well-designed environmental policies is itself endogenous to the 
choice of technological specialization in renewable energy, both depending on aggregate preference 
for environmental quality. In particular, environmental policies are likely to be affected both by the 
level and the distribution of income (Boyce 2003, Magnani 2000) and by political factors, such as the 
 
3. For example in the most favored geographical locations, wind proves to be almost as competitive as other 
forms of electricity generation (IEA), whereas solar energy still displays costs significantly higher than fossil 
fuel energy sources (see, e.g., IEA Experience curve for energy technology). 
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level of corruption and government quality (e.g. Lopez and Mitra 2000). If environmental quality is 
considered high in the hierarchical scale, the characteristics of the median voter/consumer are likely to 
influence both individual and social preferences for a cleaner environment (e.g. Vona and Patriarca 
2011). Especially in the decentralized paradigm of energy generation, the level and the distribution of 
income are also likely to have an impact on the demand for the equipment required to produce energy 
from renewable sources, i.e. photovoltaic cells.   
The empirical analysis of this paper attempts to jointly address the issues of endogeneity of 
environmental policies and of the impact of liberalization on renewable energy innovation. To address 
the issue of policy endogeneity, we develop an indicator of renewable energy policy that preserves the 
informational content of individual policies and, at the same time, is most suitable to be instrumented 
(Section 3).With the exception of Popp (2002), this paper represents the first attempt of considering 
policy endogeneity for renewable energy innovation and, therefore, represents a useful complement to 
the analysis by JHP (2010). To measure the degree of market regulation, we use the time-varying, 
sector-specific indicator of product market regulation developed at the OECD.  
Another empirical issue is related to the combined effects of policy with product market regulation. 
The most obvious reason for the emergence of synergetic effect relates to the timing of events: the 
process of liberalization, starting in the 90s, has been accompanied by a greater environmental concern 
for raising levels of global pollutants, i.e. GHGs, and by the gradual adoption of pro-active 
environmental policies. Typically, liberalization may have fostered the entry of new innovative firms 
only if policy interventions decrease the initially high costs of R&D projects. Therefore, one could 
claim that substantial public investments in basic research should complement private R&D efforts 
following liberalization. Finally, the initial condition of the energy markets and on the characteristics 
of knowledge stock are likely to be very important in explaining possibly heterogeneous effects of 
both variables on innovation. More precisely, both liberalization and environmental policies might 
spur the entry of new innovative firms only in presence of adequate know-how and organizational 
capabilities in the DG paradigm of energy production as opposed to the centralized one4.  
At the methodological level, we follow Cameron and Trivedi (2009) and use cluster-robust standard 
errors to account for mild cases of overdispersion. This choice also fosters the comparison of our 
baseline Fixed Effect Poisson estimates with GMM Poisson ones where we instrument the policy 
index. We then carry out several robustness exercises, including area-specific time-trends, clustering 
 
4. Denmark represents the prototypical example of the factors required to succeed in renewable energy 
technologies. To summarize, key ingredients of the Danish success in wind were the existence of in-
loco complementary knowledge in DG methods of energy production; the entry of small firms and 
intermediate producers of turbine, also favoured by the earlier entry in the more liberalized Californian 
market; the strong role of community’s ownership, opposition to nuclear power and cooperation 
among different actors; the importance of balancing hydropower due to the proximity of Norway and 
Sweden.  
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data by both country and technology sub-fields and considering accurate measures of the knowledge 
stock, diversity and of patent quality (Popp 2003, Nesta 2008). 
The paper is organized as follows next Section briefly discusses the expected effects of the factors 
affecting renewable energy technologies. Section 3 describes the main variables of the analysis, while 
section 4 the empirical strategy. Section 5 the main results and Section 6 the conclusions.  
2. Factors affecting renewable energy innovations 
The establishment of comparative advantages in given renewable energy technology depends on a host 
of factors, which we present in this Section. More precisely, Sub-section 2.1 is concerned with the 
main explanation found existing studies:  the effects of energy prices and environmental policies on 
environmental innovation. Sub-section 2.2 points to market structure and liberalization, which is the 
main novel factor considered in this paper. Sub-section 2.3 considers additional explanations that are 
tested jointly with the more traditional one in our empirical analysis.  
2.1 Environmental Policies and Energy Prices 
Early theoretical studies on the impact of environmental regulation on firms’ competitiveness 
emphasize the trade-off between lowering marginal costs of production and compliance with 
environmental regulation (see for a review, Jaffe, 1995). In a profit optimizing perspective, in fact, if 
there are convenient ways of tackling pollution, firm would have already adopted these opportunities, 
so environmental regulation should lower firms’ efficiency. In this perspective, early literature (Pethig 
1975, Yohe 1979, McGuire 1982) suggests that a nation’s competitive advantage could be influenced 
negatively by environmental regulation, and that in the long term industry may tend to move from 
more regulated countries to less regulated ones5. 
Historically, however, the increase in oil prices, brought about by the two crises of the 70s, does not 
only increase production cost, but also provides the first push for investment in energy efficiency and 
green R&D. Both historical evidence and increasing environmental concerns inspire a new literature 
that explicitly considers the dynamic effect of regulation on the incentive of doing innovation and 
eventually changing consumer’s habits. Seminal works of Porter (1991) and Porter and Van der Linde 
(1995) stressed that the conventional debate of the relationship between competitiveness and 
regulation was based on the wrong assumption of static technological environment, which is not 
suitable to understand a relationship characterized by an intrinsic dynamics. The idea is actually a 
variant of the classical theory of induced innovation (Hicks 1932, Binswanger 1974), maintaining that 
an increase in the price of an input will stimulate technological change aimed at saving it. In this 
particular case, allowing technology to respond to higher costs of polluting inputs, the negative effect 
of regulation on competitiveness in the short-term might be more offset by the positive effect of 
regulation on innovation. 
 
5. Less regulated countries are often called in environmental studies “Pollution Haven” (Copeland and Taylor 2004). 
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The positive effect can operate through several channels: creating pressure that motivate innovation 
and energy efficiency, reducing uncertainty on green investment and signaling firms about potential 
inefficiencies and technological improvements (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Moreover, the 
positive effect of environmental regulation on innovation can be amplified by feed-back from the latter 
to the former: innovation lowers generation costs in new technologies and hence allows to accomplish 
more ambitious environmental targets (Downing and White 1986). Finally, another important channel 
through which environmental policies can stimulate green technologies is through the adoption of new 
capital equipment, hence favouring scrapping of old polluting machines can have positive effects on 
green technology (e.g. Xepapadeas and Zeeuw 1999).  
Amore recent strand of theoretical literature examines the ‘double externality’ problem associated with 
environmental innovations (Jaffe et al. 2005, Fisher and Newell 2008, Acemoglu et al. 2010). Firms 
might under-invest in green technologies both because the output of their R&D investment is easily 
appropriable by their competitors and because compliance to environmental regulation is costly, at least 
if the innovative choice is not profitable. The main policy implication of these studies is that policy 
measures targeting only the environmental externality are likely to reduce the competitiveness of the 
firm even in presence of a good potential for green technologies. As a result, the optimal policy mix 
consists of two policies, one for each externality: a carbon tax and a subsidy to green R&D, which might 
jointly produce a win-win outcome in terms of competitiveness-sustainability6. The need for subsidies 
and incentives is more pressing when green technologies display a strongly forward-bias profile, i.e. high 
initial investments in physical capital offset by lower variable costs as for solar and wind energy.  
The variety of trade-offs and possible effects highlighted by the theoretical literature makes it difficult 
to derive clear-cut policy implications and commonly accepted conclusions. The evaluation of the 
effects of environmental policies on innovation remains mostly an empirical issue. In one of the first 
contribution, Lanjouw and Mody (1993) found that increasing compliance costs have a positive effect 
on innovation, with a one to two year lag, for U.S., Japan and Germany. In this case the authors used 
environmental related patent as proxy for green innovation, and expenditure for compliance with 
environmental regulation as proxy of environmental policy. For the period 1973-1991, Jaffe and 
Palmer (1995) exploits the rich information of a panel dataset of U.S manufacturing firms and show 
that pollution abatement expenditure (PACE) have a significant positive effect on innovation 
measured as R&D expenditure, but an insignificant effect on R&D measured as number of patents7.  
More recently, Popp (2003) found that the introduction of the clean air act in 1990 increased the SO2 
abatement efficiency and lowered the production costs of 186 U.S. plants. Interestingly, another 
 
6. Acemoglu et al. (2010) derive this result in a fully-fledged general equilibrium endogenous growth model 
where the green technology is initially less productive than the polluting one. This optimal policy mix can work 
in the long-run, but an initial slowdown in productivity, related to the time required to develop the green 
technology, is unavoidable.   
7. A common critique at these studies is that the authors used overall patent counts and not environmental ones. 
This may motivate the contradictory result obtain with the two dependent variables. 
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important driver of abatement efficiency is the type of innovation developed by firms, measured as 
patent counts in SO2 relevant fields8. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) conducted an analysis on the 
determinant of environmental innovation, using as main explanatory variables pollution abatement 
expenditures, number of air and water pollution control inspections and international competition. 
They found that both abatement expenditures and international competition are significant driver of 
environmental patent counts, while the number of inspections is not statistically significant. Another 
work of Popp(2006) using also patent counts for Germany, the U.S. and Japan, shows how in the case 
of NOx, national regulation spurred innovation for national firms but not from foreign ones. 
Moreover, through the use of patent citations he also find that seminal environmental innovations in 
foreign countries (especially Japan) play an important role in the development of US patents in the 
field of NOX reduction, confirming the hypothesis that domestic researchers are building on foreign 
innovations9. Along this line, other studies for the US confirm that the environmental regulation had a 
positive impact on innovation in the paper mills’ technology (Gray and Shabagia, 1998) and in the 
auto industry (Lee et. al. 2011).  
The implications of these works are of a particular interest in the case of a growing, but still limited 
sector like renewables, in which in the absence of a public intervention, production costs are generally 
higher than the one of fossil fuel derivate. In the last thirty years, many different environmental 
policies have been introduced in OECD countries in order to reduce this cost gap and to increase the 
share of renewables in the country energy portfolio. Examples of such measures are: tradable 
renewable energy certificates, feed-in tariffs, production quotas, and tax credits (see section 3 and the 
appendix A for details). The effect of these policies on innovation is the aim of JHP (2010), the paper 
more closely related to ours, which, using a panel dataset covering 25 OECD countries for the period 
1978-2003, found that environmental policies play a significant role in determining the flow of patent 
application in many renewable technologies, with a different intensity among technologies and policy 
instruments. With regards to the effects of different policies on different technologies, guaranteed 
price schemes and investment incentives appear to have a major role in the early phase of 
technological development, whereas for relatively more mature technologies, i.e. wind, obligation and 
quantity-based instruments work better. This study also controls for the role played by demand related 
variables (e.g. growth of electric consumption) and energy prices. Interestingly these variables are not 
significant except in the case of solar renewables, where energy price is associated with a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient.  The related work of Popp et. al. (2011) stressed as policies (mainly 
the Kyoto protocol) played a fundamental role in promoting the per-capita investment in renewable 
capacity at country level, for the period 1979-2008. Nevertheless, this overall effect is heterogeneous 
 
8. Moreover, before 1990, innovation was in fact mainly related to cost-reducing technologies, while it became 
more oriented towards improving the environmental effectiveness of production after that date. 
9. A more recent paper on the effects of knowledge spillovers at the international level is the one of Galeotti and 
Verdolini (2010). 
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across renewable sources being strong and significant in the case of biomasses, waste and wind, and 
weak or even absent, in the case of Solar (PV) technology. Besides this main effect, a variable 
representing knowledge stock show a positive, but weak, effect on renewable energy investments, 
while different production structures, like the presence of nuclear power and hydropower are generally 
associated with lower investment in renewable capacity. 
Differently from JHP, positive and significant impact of energy prices on innovation are found in 
micro studies for the US by Jaffe and Stavins (1995) for thermal insulation in civil buildings and by 
Newell et al. (1999) for energy-efficient durable goods (air conditioners and water heaters), which 
show that the direction of innovation responded to both increase in energy prices and energy-
efficiency labelling10. Using U.S patent from 1970 to 1994, Popp (2002) estimates the effect of time 
variation in energy prices, public R&D and the existing knowledge stock. Also in this case, energy 
prices are associated with a statistically significant and positive coefficient, i.e. have a direct effect on 
innovation, while the knowledge stock is associated with an increase in patenting activities. In 
particular, he uses two different knowledge stock variables: a simple sum of previous U.S. patents, and 
a sum of previous U.S. patents weighted by a productivity parameter, which measure the likelihood 
that patents granted in a given year will be cited by subsequent patents. Possibly, different results on 
the impact of energy prices have to do with the timing of the events: the impact of the dramatic 
increase in energy prices of 70s counts more in older studies than in new one where prices back to 
their long-run value and the policy inducement turns out being paramount. 
2.2 Market Structure, Liberalization and Renewable Energy Innovation 
The relationship between innovation and competition has been deeply analyzed by vast economic 
literature on endogeneous growth (e.g. Boone 2000, 2001, Aghion and Howitt 1998). The usual 
argument put forward by first generation models, claiming imperfect competition to enhance the 
appropriability of R&D investments, has been challenged by new strand of literature offering a more 
problematic view of this relationship. Aghion et al. (2001, 2005) developed models where an escaping 
competition effect counterbalances the standard appropriability effect. In order to retain their market 
shares, incumbents are induced to invest more in R&D if the competitive pressure of new entrants is 
higher and they are close enough to the existing technological frontier. On the other hand, higher 
pressure of new entrants discourages R&D investments of incumbents far from the frontier, whose 
competences are too distant from the ones needed to imitate leading-edge technologies. As a result of 
these contrasting forces, the relationship between innovation and competition might result inversely 
 
10. Interesting the relationship between technology and energy prices is not smooth in this case. Until beginning 
of the 70s much innovation was autonomous, but with the rapid increased in energy prices experienced in these 
years, technological change became always more biased towards energy prices. Moreover, also in this case 
labelling and governmental standards play a significant role in defining the average energy efficiency of these 
products menu. The analysis was conducted using U.S. data from 1953 to 1993. 
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U-shaped with the maximum innovative effort reached when the appropriability and the escaping 
competition effect counterbalance each other11. 
These models are not informative on which type of market structure is more likely to support radical 
innovations, i.e. the ones needed to open new trajectories of incremental improvements (Dosi 1988). 
On this point, Baumol (2002) notices that large oligopolistic firms engaged in routinized R&D and 
small firms with breakthrough technologies often coexist in many markets. In particular, incumbents 
and entrants share the innovative labour according to their specific competitive advantages. The 
advantage of the incumbents is in carrying on innovative activities aimed at incremental improvements 
of their existing capacity, thereby exploiting their first-mover advantage. Entrants, instead, do not bear 
the burden of destructive innovations on their existing capacity and hence can more easily undertake 
radical innovative activities. Since small entrants bear a disadvantage in appropriating the returns of 
routinized R&D activities, radical innovations are for entrants the only strategy to survive. As a result, 
during their life-cycle, firms modify the type of innovative activities they carry on and gradually shift 
to routinized R&D activities (e.g. Winter 1984, Klepper 1996). 
In energy markets, there are two issues that render the formulation of a-priori hypotheses on the 
relationship between market structure and renewable energy innovation particularly cumbersome. 
From a technological viewpoint, renewable energy innovations are radical and destructive for the 
centralized paradigm of energy production (David and Wright 2003, Elliott 2000, Lehtonen and Nye 
2009). In fact, while production of energy from new, more promising renewable sources (e.g. wind, 
solar, bioenergy) is mainly decentralized in small-medium sized units, the competences of existing 
incumbents are tied to large scale plants using coal, nuclear or gas as primary energy inputs. 
Moreover, high sunk costs of large scale generation exacerbate the lock-in of existing incumbents and, 
together with the expected obsolescence of their assets, feed their political opposition against the DG 
paradigm (e.g. Neuhoff 2005, Jacobsson and Bergek 2004, Nilsson et al. 2004, Lauber and Mez 2004). 
As a result, one should expect that new entrants have a comparative advantage in renewable energy 
technologies and in related infrastructures (i.e. smart grids). Accordingly, the widespread process of 
liberalization of energy markets, occurred from early 90s, should have contributed to increase 
innovative efforts in the field of renewable12.   
 
11. Cross country evidence on the effect of competition on innovation is mixed. It is positive, but using time-
invariant index of barriers, in Bassanini and Ernst (2002) and negative, but not robust to outliers, in Griffith and 
Harrison (2004). The inclusion or exclusion of Scandinavian countries affects deeply the shape of the 
relationship between the mark-up and innovation. Concerning radical innovations, liberal countries do not show 
a higher propensity to introduce radical innovation w.r.t. regulated ones, but US outlier (e.g. Akkermanns et al. 
2009). 
12. Liberalization has generally implied establishment of authority to control for abuse of market power; 
privatization and ownership fragmentation; promotion of a progressive unbundling of distribution, generation 
and transmission activities; letting customers to freely choose their favorite supplier. Moreover, transparent 
approval of procedures for building new plants and easing access to the electricity grid has been particularly 
important to stimulate entry of new players. The index of product market regulation combines these 
administrative barriers with the measures of degree of unbundling, market concentration, consumers’ choice and 
privatization. See section 3.  
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A potential weakness of this argument is well discussed in the paper of Jamasb and Pollitt (2008), who 
manifest skepticism about the incentives of private companies to be engaged in R&D projects with a 
long-term payback horizon. Put it differently, liberalizing energy market might have induced new, 
often private, companies to be engaged in short-term research rather than in fundamental research, 
needed to develop renewable energy technologies. In liberalized markets, lack of financial support for 
risky investments can represent another cause of under-investment in renewable energy technology 
(Nehoff 2005). Finally, the outcome of liberalization is not always a reduction in the scale of operation 
as market integration might have increased market concentration and favoured the emergence of few 
large players with excessive market power. For instance, this latter concern applies for Nordpool--the 
market between Scandinavian countries established in second half of the 90s (see IEA 2005)-- that 
recently became very concentrated following a series of mergers & acquisition among main national 
champions. Until now, the empirical evidence supporting a negative effect of liberalization on R&D 
expenditures has been limited to the US (Dooley 1998) and the UK (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008), but 
does not directly apply to green R&D and does not seem to hold for patents (Jamasb and Pollitt 2010). 
Another critical aspect of the relationship between renewable energy innovation and market structure 
relates to the complementary factors that might determine which of these contrasting forces eventually 
prevail. A first important complementarity is the one between existing skills and organizational 
capabilities in DG, on the one hand, and liberalization, on the other. Rather than replacing state 
monopolies with few large players that are likely to behave collusively, liberalization could foster 
decentralized production and entry of new players only in presence of the adequate in loco know-how. 
The relevant know-how is related to the capacity of self-producing energy and, historically, has been 
developed in co-generation production, local heating systems and farm and industry self-production13 
(e.g. Granovetter and McGuire 1998, Lehtonen and Nye 2009). Interestingly, even if energy 
generation was mainly provided in a centralized way when liberalizations started in the late 80s, cross-
country differences were remarkable with several Nordic and central European countries maintaining a 
significant share of DG and a relatively more dispersed ownership14. 
The importance of the initial degree of decentralization in energy production and of entry barriers is 
evident in many examples. For instance, already in the early 80s--so before the kick-off of the 
liberalization process, Johnson and Jacobsson (2003), Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) and Nilsson at al. 
(2004) provide anecdotal evidence of sustained entry of new small producers of wind turbines in 
 
13. According to IEA statistics, 80% of self-generation occurs in four industries: chemical, refining, food, and pulp 
and paper. Historically, the emergence of the paradigm of centralized production at the beginning of the twentieth 
century depended on various socio-economic and technological factors, i.e. network externalities, beyond the scope of 
this paper (see David and Bunn 1988, David and Wright 2003, Granovetter and McGuire 1998). 
14. Liberalizations of electricity sector started first in Anglo-Saxon countries in late 80s, then in Scandinavian 
countries in first half of the 90s, then in central European in the late 90s and finally in southern European 
countries (Glachant and Finon 2003, IEA 2003). Glachant and Finon (2003) distinguish two models of energy 
production prevalent in Europe before liberalization: a relatively more dispersed ownership was present in all 
countries located North-East with respect to the axis London-Paris-Rome-Athens; the opposite for countries 
located west. Cossent et al. (2009) discuss the effects of the current regulatory regime on DG.  
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Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark and Germany15. Historical accidents played a key role in maintaining 
alive a DG system in west Denmark where the slow integration into the national grid turned out being 
an advantage when conversion to renewable was needed. Apart from Denmark, also in other countries 
quite successful in renewable technologies and cogeneration (i.e. Germany, Netherlands and Sweden) 
centralized generation does not completely replace industry self-production of energy and localized 
heating systems using cogeneration, waste and biomass. In Sweden, the local heating systems were 
very successful in shifting from fossil fuel primary energy to bioenergy as the concern for 
environment quality emerged (IEA 2008 on Sweden, Nilsson et al. 2004). All in all, existing capacity 
to produce energy from decentralized sources and to manage two-ways flow of energy in the network 
(Lehtonen and Nye 2009) appears stronger in countries that, ex-post, were able to develop a 
comparative advantage in renewable energy technology. 
Finally, a positive effect of liberalization on renewable energy innovation might prevail only in 
countries with particularly strict environmental regulation and/or active policies in promoting 
decentralized sources of energy production. In this view, the combination of liberalized market, 
organizational skills in decentralized production and active environmental policies would be the 
optimal configuration to foster renewable energy innovations. Alternatively, further moving along the 
lines suggested by Jamasb and Pollitt (2008), liberalization might have had positive effect on 
renewable energy innovations only in presence of a substantial initial public stimulus, i.e. large scale 
public R&D and demonstration projects. In sum, the complex relationship between degree of 
competition and innovation in the energy sector requires to look at the potential interaction that an 
index of competition might have with: 1. Environmental policies, 2. Initial conditions before 
liberalization in terms of capabilities in DG and public R&D16.    
2.3 Other Factors: Demand and Political Factors 
Among the other factors affecting environmental innovations, Beise and Rennings (2005) suggest that 
demand for green goods and environmentally-friendly production methods play significant role. 
Related to this, learning by doing has been recognized as a main source of technological development 
for renewable energy technologies (e.g. Newell and Stavins 2004). Furthermore, the emergence of a 
sizable demand for green products allows carrying out network investments needed to fully exploit the 
potential of renewable energy, i.e. micro-grids. Whereas there are historical exceptions where foreign 
markets have been crucial (i.e. Danish constructors of wind turbines greatly benefited from the 
exploitation of the Californian market), domestic markets appear particularly important in view of the 
difficulties to stock and transfer several green goods, i.e. wind turbines (e.g. Lewis and Wiser 2007), 
eco-building, recycling, bio-food, etc., included renewable energy. As a result, it is important to 
 
15. These firms were either entrepreneurial start-ups or mechanical engineering firms (Johnson and Jacobsson 2003).   
16. Also important can be structural breaks associated with market integration, i.e. Nordpool for Scandinavian 
countries. However, market integration in Europe is still limited and was even more so in the central historical 
period covered by this paper.  
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identify the internal factors that, together with targeted policies and the market structure, contribute to 
create a critical mass of demand for renewable energy.  
In principle, as energy is an undifferentiated good, consumption choices should respond only to price 
signals.  However, recent empirical evidence suggest that the willingness to pay higher prices for 
green energy appears in fact positively related to per-capita income and educational attainments 
(Oecd2008, Diaz-Rainey and Ashton 2009, Eurobarometer, IEA 2006-Denmark).The observed 
willingness to pay can be lower for poorer households because the additional price paid for green 
energy does not offset the higher opportunity cost of giving up consumption of other goods. Income 
constraints can also prevent households to buy durable goods and equipment with high initial cost, e.g. 
Photo-voltaic cells (Oecd 2008, Diaz-Rainey and Ashton 2009). These pieces of evidence clarify why 
environmental quality can be conveniently considered as a good that consumers are willing to buy 
only after having satisfied more basic needs. Under these circumstances, lowering inequality should 
positively affect the extent to which a society substitutes polluting goods with green ones depending 
on the level of per capita income (e.g. Vona and Patriarca 2011)17. Higher potential demand for 
environmental quality can either be translated into political voice to approve a stricter regulation, or 
affect directly consumption choices and other socio-political aspects usually unobservable to the 
econometrician. For instance, the willingness to build in-loco DG facilities often depends on the 
budget of local administrators, which responds to the needs of the local communities and of local 
stakeholders18. Clearly, a smart grid increasing the effectiveness of renewable energy generation is 
more likely built when each consumer is willing to buy a fraction of the lumpy cost of the grid. 
As a higher aggregate demand for environmental quality triggers technological improvements through 
learning-by-doing on the producer side and learning-by-using on the consumer side, one should 
observe a negative relationship between inequality and innovation in environmental technologies. 
Vona and Patriarca (2011) demonstrate that this negative relationship almost disappears in countries 
with low level of income per-capita: if the median consumer cannot afford the higher initial cost of 
green goods, only the existence of a fringe of wealthy consumers can sustain a minimum demand 
threshold. For OECD countries and using many indicators of environmental innovations, existing 
 
17. For a given level of per capita income, a richer median consumer would be willing to pay a premium for 
environmental quality and, at the same time, would support stricter environmental regulation, both at the local 
and at the national level. 
18. The Danish case where more than 80% of wind turbines are owned by cooperatives or individual famers is a 
good example. Another example is the one of Swedish heating districts, which are also owned and managed by 
cooperatives, small groups or families. There are other mechanisms through which, for a given level of income 
per capita, a lower income inequality can positively affect the emergence of social preferences for a cleaner 
environment. First, those who prefer a more equal society often prefer a cleaner environment and care more 
about future generations (d’Addio 2007). Second, social capital is usually higher in more equal society (Easterly 
2001, Easterly et al. 2006). Third, more inequality and social segregation reduce positive behavioral spillovers 
from the more informed rich people to the less informed poor ones. A good example is the one of hazardous 
waste sites with poorer communities much more likely to accept these sites in their neighborhoods (Gawande et 
al. 2001). Four, public sector expenditures are normally higher in more equal societies (e.g. Benabou 1996). 
However, using school districts in the US as unit of analysis, recent empirical evidence shows that public 
expenditures increase with the level of inequality (Boustan et al. 2011). 
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empirical analyses confirm the theoretical predictions that the impact of inequality is generally 
negative and much stronger for wealthy countries (Magnani 2000, Vona and Patriarca 2011). 
In sum, the role of market size and political factors in fostering environmental innovation should vary 
with both the level of inequality and of per-capita income. Yet their influence on the development of 
renewable energy technologies depends on radically different reasons. Larger markets act as a 
guarantee for energy supply, thereby offsetting the intermittencies in wind or solar power production 
with excess capacity from more traditional sources. The case of the Nordpool market is a good 
example in place: Norway’s hydropower, the best buffer technology for its negligible operating costs, 
allows the development of Danish wind energy without bearing the cost of installing capacity to 
compensate for days of low wind19. On the contrary, in highly integrated markets, regulatory 
spillovers are likely to generate positive inducement effects outside the country and push the diffusion 
of more ambitious environmental policies (see the classical analysis of Popp 2006 and the Norway 
environmental targets often set on the Danish benchmark). 
With regard to political factors, the quality and reliability of policies is of particular importance in 
uncertain technological field (Marcus 1981). If firms expect large changes in environmental 
regulation, the payoff function becomes volatile, hence augmenting the propensity to delay 
investments in new technologies or adopt existing end-of-pipe solutions (Frondel et al. 2004).Again in 
the Danish prototypical example, main political parties agree on the need to maintain ambitious 
environmental policies for renewable energy production and energy saving, hence ensuring a long-
term commitment to environmental policies (IEA 2006-Denmark). Lack of political commitment for 
long-term targets is likely to be amplified in countries where public policies are perceived to be 
ineffective because frequent bribery and corruption (Lopez and Mitra 2000) or simple lack of time 
consistency. By posing an “option-value” associated with postponing the adoption of a new 
technology (e.g. Pindyck 2007), an unstable policy environment is expect to have a negative effect on 
innovation (Johnstone et. al.2010 ).This tendency is even more pronounced in the case of resource-
saving technologies, where the value of such saving depends on future energy prices, which are 
usually volatile. 
Overall, the several channels through which environmental policies, regulation in the energy sector 
and socio-political factors affect innovation in renewable energy call for the inclusion of a broad set of 
potential interactions in the empirical specification. Prior to the presentation of our empirical strategy, 
next Section describes the main variables at stake.     
 
19. Interestingly, the International Energy Agency puts a lot of emphasis on the importance of balancing 
hydropower from Norway (99%) and Sweden (40%) for the Danish boom in wind energy. This seemed a fair 
deal for all: on the one hand, interconnections with Norway and Sweden allow Denmark to balance stochastic 
variation in wind power; on the other hand, Danish consumers pay the higher energy prices required to finance 
R&D in wind with positive technological and pecuniary spillovers (lower costs of compliance with the EU 
regulation) for all Nordic countries. Conversely, in particularly isolated countries facing extreme wheater 
conditions, unsecure supply could force to use low quality oil and temporarily relax environmental standards, i.e. 
Italy in the winter 2005-6. 
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3. Data, measurement issues and descriptive evidence 
The set of variables to be included in the empirical analysis concerns a potentially large host of 
factors, ranging from innovation measurement to policy types, not mentioning the more traditional 
macroeconomic characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the list of variables and descriptive statistics. 
Dependent variable. We use patent counts and citation-weighted patent counts as our proxy for 
innovation performance. This choice is consistent with prior studies on renewable energy innovations 
such as Popp (2003), (2006) and JHP (2010). We use patents registered in the nine sub-fields: wind, 
marine, solar thermal, solar photovoltaic, biofuels, hydroelectric, fuels from waste, geothermal and 
tidal (tab. 2). We are well aware of the limitations in using patent counts as a proxy for innovation. 
First and foremost, not all innovations are patented and the propensity to apply for a patent grant may 
vary a great deal from one firm to another, one sector to another and one country to another. Yet 
energy generation is likely to become a single global market, and the potential benefits induced by 
innovation in renewable energy are so vast that we may safely assume homogeneity in patent 
propensity across country. Patents are not the only proxy for innovation in renewable energy. Installed 
capacity is another relevant candidate. However, such capacity investments depend highly on factors 
not related with innovation per see, especially the geographical endowment of a given country20. 
Second, Nehoff (2005) questions the use of patents as a good proxy for innovation in renewable 
energy. He argues that such technologies consist of a large set of components and require the expertise 
of several companies. Therefore, a substantial degree of coordination among several actors is required 
to patents, which in turn inhibits patent applications.  Although we concur with this remark, patent 
information is the only systematic and exhaustive database which is readily available to scientists. 
Patent information makes it possible to build a series of indicators across countries. Of importance is 
the availability of the technological content of patent. This allows us to not only distinguish an 
invention in renewable energy from other invention, but also the identify the type of renewable energy 
sources it concerns.  
A third and last limitation lies in the substantial heterogeneity in the economic value of patents (Archibugi, 
1992; Pavitt, 1988). A patented invention may be technology novel with no or only little economic value. 
Hence patent grasp invention, more so than successful innovation (and past works have repeatedly used 
quality weighted patent counts to account for their economic value In this respect, the number of citations 
received by a patent has been shown to embody substantial economic value, although this measure remain 
somewhat noisy (Gambardella et al., 2008). In this paper, we therefore use of citation weighted patent 
counts to account for heterogeneity in patent economic value (Hall et al., 2001). 
Environmental Policies. We use the database on public policies for renewable energy compiled at the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and previously used by JHP 2010. This database and the related 
 
20. The degree of correlation between patents in a specific renewable energy field and the installed capacity is 
however quite high as shown by Popp et al. (2011). 
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IEA (2000) publications contain detailed fact sheets at the country level that make it possible to 
construct a chronology of policy adoption for most OECD countries. Figure 1 in Appendix A 
summarizes the year of adoption of all available policies. In particular in this work, we considered the 
following policy instruments (further details in the appendix A, see table 3): 
1) Research and development expenditures, at national level, taken from taken from the OECD 
Statistics. We refer in the analysis at both general R&D and sector specific R&D (Solar, Wind 
and other renewables). We control both for overall R&D expenditures and include in our 
index a dummy variable for public R&D projects taking value 0 prior to the introduction of 
the project, 1 thereafter. A second dummy variable has been created for those country which 
implemented additional R&D programs (or strengthened significantly the existing ones); 
2) Investment incentives, i.e. capital grants and all other measures aimed at reducing the capital 
cost of adopting renewable energy technologies. It may also take the form of third party 
financial arrangements, where central governments handle part of the risk or provide low 
interest rate on loans. These are generally provided by State budgets and we used a dummy 
variable that takes value 0 prior to the introduction, 1 thereafter; 
3) Tax measures, used either to encourage production or discourage consumption. They may 
have the form of investment tax credit or property tax exemptions, in order to reduce tax 
payments for project owner. An example is the US tax credit for wind (1992). Excises are not 
directly accounted here unless they were explicitly created to promote renewables (for 
example excise tax exemptions). Again, we used a dummy variable that takes value 0 prior to 
the introduction, 1 thereafter; 
4) Incentive tariff (feed-in), i.e. guaranteed price above market tariff rates for a certain number of 
years. The environmental authority sets a premium price to be paid for power generated from 
renewables. In this case both the dummy variable and the intensity of the tariff are available; 
5) Voluntary programs, adopted at country level by different stakeholders involved in the energy 
sector, i.e. government, public utilities and energy suppliers that agree to buy energy generated 
from renewable sources.  One of the first voluntary programs was in Denmark in 1984, when 
utilities agreed to buy 100MW of wind power. The variable is also expressed as a dummy 
variable for adoption; 
6) Obligations, which place a requirement on suppliers to provide a share of their energy supply 
from renewable energy. As in the above, this variable is a dummy variable for adoption; 
7) Renewable energy Certificates (RECs). Tradable certificates are generally used to track or 
document compliance with quota system. At national level part of the total electricity produced 
generally must be generated by renewables or covered with a renewable energy certificate. In this 
specific case both a dummy variable and the number of certificates is available.  
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In this work we are especially interested in having a single variable that represents the overall policy 
intensity in support of environmental innovation for a given country. In particular, an aggregate policy 
index is especially suitable for our analysis with our focus on policy endogeneity, rather than on the 
mere effects of each single policy on different technologies as in JHP (2010). For these reasons, we 
construct a policy index that attempt to synthesize the regulation intensity for a given country in a 
given year using all available information regarding the implementation of national related policies. 
Thus, starting from the information available about the seven types of policies described above, the 
policy index is a simple average of all available policies expressed as dummy and normalized as to 
range from 0 to 1. This index is both time-variant and country specific. Similar examples of 
environmental policy index based on a synthesis of diverse policy performances can be found in 
Dasgupta et al. (1995), Eliste and Fredrikkson (1998) and Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009). 
Clearly a single index built on dummy variables presents several limits. As highlighted by JHP, the 
ideal policy index would need to be continuous in all its dimensions to capture the intensity of each 
policy. Moreover, a single index implies a net loss of information as the differential impact of each 
policy on each sub-field of renewable energy patent cannot be detected, which is especially 
problematic in presence of a large heterogeneity in the policy-technology linkages (e.g. JHP 2010). In 
a correlated paper, we demonstrate that the good instruments for our policy index holds for a policy 
index, which --using a subset of more recent years and EU countries for which we have information on 
policy intensity-- takes into account of the intensity of different policies (Nicolli and Vona 2012). One 
can hence conclude that instrumenting the policy index here as in Nicolli and Vona (2012) mitigates 
the measurement error derived from missing information on policy intensity.   
Figures 2-3-4 depict the patterns of the policy index for selected countries showing the generalized 
and almost everywhere monotonic increase of the index. 
Product market regulation.  Measuring market competition is certainly an ambitious task, especially 
because it is difficult to disentangle exogenous and endogenous determinants of effective market 
competition. With regards to indicators based on opinion surveys, e.g. ‘doing business indicator’ of the 
World Bank, the index of Product Market Regulation of the OECD (PMR henceforth) has the 
advantage of being built on objective policies and regulation specific to certain sectors. Moreover, the 
issue of endogeneity is less severe for the PMR as policies affecting competition, rather than a direct 
measure of it, are considered21. The index is built following a bottom-up approach that combines 
different data sources22. For each sector, the index combines information on barriers to 
 
21. Sources of endogeneity related to the market structure are negligible under the plausible assumption that 
liberalization and policies favouring the entry of new players are not pushed by powerful incumbents. This 
source of endogeneity should be weak for renewable energy that represents a small fraction of total installed 
power and hence--at least in the past--is not likely to affect the liberalization process. 
22. The data sources are for instance the privatization Barometer of the Fondazione Enrico Mattei, the Intergated 
data Base of the World Trade Organization and interviews with civil servants in particular areas. With regards to 
the building of the indicator, low level indicators are aggregated in high level ones using principal components 
analysis. For details on the construction of the index and the weighting scheme see, e.g., Conway et al. (2005). 
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entrepreneurship and administrative regulation (e.g. licenses and permits, administrative burdens, legal 
barriers), state control (e.g. price control, ownership), barriers to trade and foreign direct investment 
(e.g. tariffs, ownership barriers). For the purpose of this paper, the sector of interest is the one of 
electricity (ISIC 4010) and to a lesser extent Gas (ISIC 4020). The PMR index for electricity and gas 
essentially combines three sub-indexes ranging from 0 to 6 (maximum anti-competitive regulation). 
The first is ownership that assumes five values private (0), mostly private (1.5), mixed (3), mostly 
public (4.5) and public (6).The second is an index of entry barriers that combine information on third 
party access to the grid (regulated (0), negotiated (3), no access (6)) and minimum consumers’ size to 
freely choose their supplier (from ‘no threshold’ (0) to ‘no choice’ (6)). The third component is 
vertical integration ranging from unbundling (0) to full integration (6). Access to each sub-index of the 
aggregate index allows evaluating the importance of each element of the process of liberalization in 
the energy market.  
For European countries, another relevant goal of the widespread process of liberalization was the 
progressive integration of national markets into a unified European one. Whereas integration could 
give rise to substantial regulatory spillovers across countries, the effective integration into a single 
wholesale market is proceeding at a slow pace. In last 10-15 years, much stronger integration emerges 
in European macro-regions: the NordPool for Nordic countries and partially Germany, the APX for 
the UK and Netherlands, the OMEL for Spain and Portugal, and finally the EuroPEX for central 
European countries. In these -substantially more integrated- markets, regulatory and policy spillovers 
are significantly more likely to occur. To jointly account for all possible sources of regulatory 
spillovers, we include time trends for macro-regions covering the relatively more integrated areas23. 
Figures 5-6 show the patterns of product market regulation for selected countries and make evident the 
widespread reduction of market regulation especially in the 90s. 
Knowledge related control variables. In addition to policy variables, we explain patent generation by the 
characteristics of country’s knowledge base. To measure the knowledge base of a country is tantamount 
to collecting all the relevant quantitative characteristics that accounts for all its technological 
competencies. As such, these measures wipe out all the qualitative aspects regarding the national 
innovation system. But although distinct from broader organizational aspects such as, inter alia, the 
balance between public and private research, broader public research organizations, university-industry 
relationships, funding system and incentives environments, we view the country’s knowledge base as 
reflecting indirectly these qualitative aspects. Hence it is not the mastering of a particular technology 
The cross-country rankings of the PMR indicator appears substantially unchanged when using different 
specifications of the weighting scheme (Conway and Nicoletti 2006) and is in line with rankings derived from 
other indicators of market competition (Nicoletti and Pryor 2006).  
23. Even if this rough way of capturing regulatory spillovers, one should notice that the major integration occurred 
quite recently and hence did not contribute explaining establishment of long-term technological advantage. These 
macro-area trends should be sufficient also to control the balancing capacities, e.g. hydropower.    
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which makes a country an entity distinct from other countries. It is the set of organizations which sustain 
a portfolio of technologies which is presumably unique. In our view then, the characteristics of the 
country knowledge base reflect the country-specific organizational features. More precisely, Nesta 
(2008) has shown that a knowledge base can be exhaustively described in terms of knowledge stock and 
knowledge diversity. A given knowledge base can be described to be a function of total knowledge stock 
 and the number  of technological competencies held by the country. The amendment of  as 
done traditionally leads to the addition of knowledge diversity as an important component of a country’s 
knowledge base. The existence and relevance of this property is due to the collective nature of 
knowledge: in order to produce aggregate outcomes, diverse knowledge must be combined and 
integrated into a coherent whole. Appendix A5 presents the computation of these two measures. 
Other control variables. We include the following additional factors: total population, log of total patents, 
past (average of past three) and present energy prices in logs, past (average of past three) and present R&D 
in logs plus, in extended specifications, an index of policy uncertainty, a dummy when the Kyoto protocol 
where first ratified (in 1998), a dummy for government change, a variable for government types (coalition, 
single party, etc.), the index of perception of corruption of the World resource Institute, the fraction of 
people with tertiary education and older than 65 to capture the effect of demographic composition on 
preference for environmental quality. The index of political instability, which appears particularly 
important, is a 5-year moving average of changes in government characterized by a substantial ideological 
gap. Including the share of people with tertiary education also allows partially controlling for the human 
capital endowment, which is a key determinant of innovation. The overall number of patents, instead, is a 
crude measure of the stock of country technological competencies and propensity to patents. More 
sophisticated measures of the knowledge stock will be used for the robustness analyses using USPTO 
patents. See the appendix for the sources of each variable24. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Baseline Specification  
We use fixed effect Poisson regressions with cluster-robust standard errors (country as the cluster unit) 
that delivers accurate estimates in case of mild overdisperion (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). This 
allows easing the comparison with GMM Poisson ones where we instrument the policy index. The 
point is that it is difficult to test whether overdispersion is mild or not, so there is a trade-off between 
using Poisson regressions instead than Negative Binomial—as would be advocated in our case from 
standard overdispersion tests. However, since results on the main variables do not strongly change 
when using Negative Binomial regressions, our cluster-robust Poisson regression seems a reasonable 
starting point. To further refine our results, we carry on four robustness exercises: 1. including area-
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24. Differently from JHP (2010), we do not include growth in electricity consumption as it is strongly 
correlated with population dynamics, the stage of development of a country and energy prices.   
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specific time-trends, e.g. for Nordic countries, in order to capture unobservable time-varying factors, 
2. clustering data by both country, as in the benchmark, and technology sub-field, to account for the 
large heterogeneity within renewable technologies;  3. Controlling for accurate measures of the 
knowledge stock using USPTO data25--i.e. index of knowledge diversity (Nesta 2008) and/or stocks 
adjusted for patents’ depreciation and diffusion (Popp 2003)-- and of the market structure before 
liberalization started; 4. considering broad set of political and socio-demographic variables, i.e. 
political uncertainty, corruption, educational levels, that are likely to affect the preferences for a 
cleaner environment and hence the effectiveness of policy.  
The benchmark specification is: 
 
where stands for the number of patents applied for at the European Patent Office for country 
 at time ,  ,  and are the three variable of interest and X is a set of controls. Note 
the inclusion of a time fixed effect  accounting for a shock common to all countries and a country 
fixed effects accounting for unobserved but persistent country characteristics. We also augment 
the baseline specification with the inclusion of a specific trend for more integrated geographic area. 
Finally, our three main variables of interest, i.e. inequality (Ineq), product market regulation (PMR) 
and the policy indicator (Pol), are standardized in order to enhance the comparison of their effect on 
environmental innovation. 
The baseline specification with technology-specific effects is: 
),  (1’)           
where now standard errors and fixed effect are calculated on the cluster unit (i country, s technology). 
Among the basic controls, we consider R&D expenditures in each specific technological sub-field 
rather than aggregate R&D for all renewable technologies. In this case, the sample size significantly 
increase as for each country in each year we have patents in nine technologies, so estimates are more 
accurate and we have enough degrees of freedom to control for country-specific time trends. 
Note that both R&D expenditures and environmental policies raise issue of endogeneity. The former 
source of endogeneity is, however, mainly related to unobservable country level factors that are 
included in our analysis. To further mitigate endogeneity issues in this case, we estimate our model 
using only lagged R&D and results, available upon request, remain unchanged.  
Sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss respectively the choice of instruments for the policy indicator and the 
correct identification of the effects of PMR and of inequality on patent generation. 
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25. The Patstat data publicly available from the Oecd website contains only the number of patents by year. 
Therefore, it is impossible to effectively measure patent’s quality and building measure of the knowledge stock 
that accounts for depreciation and diffusion effects. We are in the process of reconstructing these more refined 
information from the original Patstat dataset, http://www.epo.org/.  
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4.2. Endogenous Policy 
Policy endogeneity represents an unresolved key issue for existing studies on environmental 
innovations, an exception being the work by Popp (2002). Still, these studies admit that various factors 
may jointly affect patent intensity and environmental policies. First, there is a mutual reinforcement 
effect initially recognized by Downing and White (1986): if innovation in environmental technologies 
follows the implementation of an effective policy support, progress in the generation of renewable 
energy will, in turn, provide support for that policy. Second, the effect of the policy index is very 
heterogeneous across countries, implying that unobservable factors affect both the policy and the 
propensity to patents hence. Hence an omitted variable bias plagues the estimated relationship policy-
innovation. Third, renewable energy policies are measured with a substantial error. For most policies, 
especially the one in place since the 70s and the 80s, lack of detailed information allows only for 
policy dummies, which at best are only rough proxies26. 
With regards to the choice of instruments, we assume that more ambitious environmental policies are 
adopted by more developed countries, possibly with lower inequality. This is consistent with the 
theoretical literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (see Stern 2004, Lopez 1994, Grossman and 
Krueger 1995) and with empirical evidence (e.g. Dasgupta et al. 2002, Eurobarometer, see tab. 3), 
Column 3 of Table 4 shows that both the (lagged) first and the second moment of the distribution of 
income have a significant effect on the index of environmental policy. However, the effect of 
inequality is positive rather than negative when controlling for lagged GDP pc, which instead is 
negatively correlated with inequality. Note that inequality has a much weaker effect than per capita 
GDP and it is not a good single instrument for the policy indicator. This is also evident looking at 
figure 2: Nordic countries have a level of the policy intensity below the one of the US, Germany and 
Japan. Additional variables positively correlated with the policy indicator are, as expected, a dummy 
for government change and the Kyoto dummy, reflecting international pressure for more 
environmental regulation (see col. 5, tab. 4). Together with lagged GDP per capita, these variables are 
used in overidentified specifications.  
As an alternative best instrument, we also use time of policy adoption under the assumption that, given 
uncertainty on both technology and policy, a change in policy is more effective when expected 
benefits in terms of innovation are high. For instance, expected benefits of the policy can be high if a 
path-breaking innovation opens the opportunity of further discoveries, or when a certain technology 
acquires social legitimacy and public support. In order to capture the expected gains of innovation and 
to build our “lead” variable, we use the average discounted number of PCT patents (registered under 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty) from year t+5 to 2005. Column 1 of Table 4 suggests that the lead 
variable is the best single instrument for our policy indicator.  
 
26. Note that, to a certain extent, aggregating the single policies in a unique index can somehow average away 
this measurement error by capturing overall policy intensity. 
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4.3 Identification of the effect of PMR 
Identifying the effect of PMR on renewable energy patents raises a couple of issues. First, the effect 
can conceal not an effective impact of liberalization, but it is due to initial differences in the market 
structure, the degree of diffusion in DG or can work in a complementary fashion with other policies, 
especially public R&D and targeted policies. This motivates the inclusion of a full set of interactions: 
starting from specification (1) and (1’), we consider the interactions between PMR, on the one hand, 
and the initial share of DG, the degree of centralization in the energy sector, the policy indicator and 
the per capita investment in public R&D before liberalization. The initial share of DG summarized as 
a tri-modal variable in Table 5 is essentially derived for our reading of country reports of the IEA and 
of the books IEA (2005) and Glachant and Finon (2003). Second, each single component of the PMR 
can have a different effect on patent generation and these effects might offset each other. For instance, 
while it is intuitive to expect a positive effect of lowering entry barriers on innovation, it is more 
difficult to believe that private companies are always more motivated than public ones in investing in 
technologies with forward-biased expected returns. Finally, the widespread process of liberalization 
could have increased the propensity to patent in the whole energy sector, not only for renewable 
energy patents. However, using a diff-in-diff approach, results available upon request show that the 
effect of liberalization has been larger for renewable energy patents than for generic patents in energy 
even when controlling from area trends and country fixed effects.   
5. Results 
5.1 Basic 
The results of our analysis using specification 1 are presented in Table 6. For the main explanatory 
variables (energy prices and R&D), we include both current and past levels by taking the moving 
average of the previous 3-years.  The basic controls all have the expected positive effect on patents. 
Only past energy prices have a negative effect, while current energy prices display the expected 
positive effect. In regressions available upon request, we show that the combined effect of energy 
prices, as capture by an average of past and present prices, is not statistically significant, confirming 
the scarce importance of energy prices as determinant of renewable energy patents (see also JHP 
2010). Concerning the impacts of technological inputs, a 1% increase in R&D leads to a 0.35% 
increase in patents, while the same increase in total patent has a larger .5% impact. 
Looking at Column 1, the policy index has the expected positive and significant effect on green 
patents. This effect remains substantially unchanged when both PMR and inequality are considered 
(Table 6, Columns 2 to 6), but, as expected, declines substantially when we include year fixed effects 
(Table 6, Column 3) or socio-political variables (Table 6, Column 6). This implies that both inequality 
and PMR represent two effective determinants of green technologies. Especially for PMR, however, 
our data confirm case studies evidence of a negative effect of higher regulation on environmental 
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policies, reflecting the opposition of existing utilities heavily committed in nuclear and carbon energy 
(e.g .  Jacobsson and Bergek 2004, Nilsson at al. 2004, Lauber and Mez 2004, IEA country reviews). 
This result is robust to the use of either current or lagged policy index, for its e magnitude remains 
substantially unchanged (Table 6, Column 4). To quantify the effect, note that a one standard deviation 
increase in the policy index leads to a .23% to .39% increase in expected number of renewable patents. 
Therefore, all else equal, a country with a policy persistently one-standard deviation below the average 
score for the past 30 years will accumulate a 10% disadvantage in patent counts in renewable energy. 
With regards to our second main variable of interest, i.e. product market regulation, its effect is 
negative and approximately of the same magnitude as that of the policy. More precisely, the effect of 
one-standard deviation change in PMR ranges between 0.22% and 0.35%27. As in the case of the 
policy index, the effects of both current and lagged PMR is of similar magnitude. In general, the 
positive effect of lowering entry barriers on innovation is consistent with case study evidence pointing 
to the key role of new entrants (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek 2004). Importantly,  part of the positive 
effect of lowering entry barriers on green patent is mediated by an indirect political-economy effect 
related to the reduced power of existing incumbents, which are in most cases against the adoption of 
environmental policies. 
Yet we do not claim that liberalization alone can exhaustively account for the increase in green 
patents. Pre-existing characteristics the energy market could be equally important.  Table 7 shows that 
a substantial fraction of the PMR effect is driven by the share of distributed generation before 
liberalization and by the level of public R&D in the 70s and 80s28.  The first result confirms the 
strategic importance of pre-existing material and immaterial infrastructure in the DG paradigm for the 
development of renewable energy technologies. The second result sheds light on the strong 
complementarity between public and private innovative efforts. In particular, the effect of product 
market regulation turns out significant only in countries that initially supported renewable 
technologies with public R&D programs. Interestingly, also the index of environmental policy 
displays a significantly high effect when combined with market deregulation and lower entry barriers. 
Finally, on the three components of the index, lowering entry barriers is the only statistically 
significant positive impact on innovation. Unbundling has the expected positive effect but it is only 
cut-off significant at 85% level, whereas the impact of privatization is negligible and statistically 
insignificant.  
With regards to the other variables, the impact of inequality is consistent with previous findings (Vona 
and Patriarca 2011, Magnani 2000). Lowering inequality has a positive significant effect on green 
 
27. Italy or France with relatively strict regulation in the energy sector have a PMR index ¾ of a standard 
deviation higher than Denmark and Sweden that have moderately unregulated regulation and more than a 
standard deviation higher than purely liberal countries, i.e. the US and UK.     
28. This latter variable is a tri-modal variable: high, medium and low built as terciles of the cross-country 
distribution of (PPP-adjusted) average public R&D expenditures in the period 1970-1989. 
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innovation and the effect is of the same order of magnitude as the ones of policy and PMR29. 
However, compared with the other main variables of interest, its effect is less stable across 
specifications both in term of size and of significance levels (Table 6, Column 2 and Table 9, Column 
6). Besides, the impact of inequality does not decrease after the introduction of several controls for the 
political context and for aggregate preference (Table 6, Column 6) Therefore, inequality should affect 
green technology through a demand channel rather than a political one. To provide evidence 
supporting this claim, we estimate the basic specification for different technologies. Table 8 shows 
that inequality has a much stronger impact on solar technologies, one for which consumer demand 
matters relatively more. In particular, the effect of inequality is four times as large as the benchmark 
one for solar PV and twice as large as for solar thermal. For wind energy, Denmark is confirmed to be 
an outlier as it drives upward both the effect of PMR and the one of inequality.  
Finally, among the other variables considered in Table 6, political instability has the expected negative 
effect on the expected number of patent in renewable technology (Column 6). This result is somewhat 
consistent with previous ones using a specific index of uncertainty of environmental regulation 
developed by the World Competitiveness Forum and available for shorter time span (see for example 
Johnstone et. al.2010).  Conversely, government change appears to have a positive influence on 
technology as possibly less subject to the influence of energy lobbies30.  
5.2 Technology-specific model 
With technology specific effects, we explicitly embody the large heterogeneity characterizing the set of 
technological competencies required in the development of renewable energy. Estimated coefficients could 
change in this case if part of the variability previously explained by our variables of interest was reflecting a 
mere technology effect. Table 9 shows that this is not the case and the effect of the variables of interests 
remains largely unchanged when we consider green innovation in a more detailed fashion. 
Note the stability of the term interacting policy with PMR in both Tables 8 and 9. Conversely, the 
interactions of PMR with both initial condition on DG and R&D loose their significance, but this 
result should be verified including a wider set of triple interactions PMR-technology-‘initial 
conditions’. We also estimate the model looking at the effect of single policies. What emerges is that 
obligations, taxes and feed-in-tariff are the policies that contribute more to renewable energy 
innovations. These results should be taken with care, since many policies are adopted jointly for 
several technology fields. Therefore that it is difficult to trace the individual effect for every single 
technological realm. Finally, Column 7 of Table 9 shows that the policy index is relatively more 
effective on wind technology and solar PV. These technologies were also the ones experiencing the 
fastest development in last thirty years.    
 
29. Over the time period considered, the gap in inequality between US and Swedish is almost 2 standard 
deviation. This means that, all else equal, Sweden should have produced 18-20% more patents than the US. 
30 Finally, the index of perception of corruption is never significant and so it is not included in the analysis. 
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5.3 GMM Regressions 
The second issue addressed in this paper concerns the endogeneity of the policy support. Table 10 
presents estimates of the basic specification when either lagged GDP or the adoption ‘lead’ (section 
4.2) are used as main instruments. These instruments appear valid in several different specifications, 
as suggested by the Hansen J test for over-identified restrictions. Combined with our result on the 
explanatory power of our first-stage regression (see Table XXX), this result suggests that the effect of 
GDP per capita on renewable technologies is completely mediated by its indirect effect on the policy 
index in the first place. An equivalent claim cannot be alleged for inequality, which is not a good 
exclusion restriction to instrument the policy index.  
Compared with estimations in Table 6, The policy index appears underestimated according to both our 
IV strategies. i.e. the one based on ‘leads’ and the one based on lagged GDP per capita. The magnitude 
of the estimation bias is about 40% of the original effect in the just-identified case. As expected, the 
bias in the estimated effect of the policy decreases and almost disappears when more exclusion 
restrictions are added (e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009). Nothing changes by including the lagged green 
patent in the set of explanatory variables (Comlums 3 and 7 of Table 10). Likewise, the effect of the 
other variables is not directly altered in GMM regressions. Overall, one can conclude that the 
estimation bias alters neither the sign nor the significance of the policy index, although its effect is 
significantly underestimated in the Poisson FE setting.  
5.4 Robustness using USPTO 
With USPTO data, we take advantage of information of the quality of patents and use both citations, 
received by the patent up to three years after application. Moreover, we extend our measure of country 
knowledge stock with the inclusion of a scalar regarding knowledge diversity (for details see appendix 
A). Finally, we distinguish between the knowledge stock in green technologies from the general 
knowledge stock, proxy of the country level of competencies. 
The use of USPTO data constrains us to estimate a model with policy dummies rather than the 
aggregate index. The reason is that Nordic countries, while having a high patent intensity in the 
European Patent Office, have a much lower propensity to patent at the US patent office. Hence, the 
policy index does not explain much of the variation in patent intensity in the US.  A caveat follows 
from this: we estimate our model excluding Denmark, i.e. the leader country in the environmental 
policy, and all outliers with zero USPTO green patents through the period of interest (Greece, Czech 
Rep., New Zealand, Poland, Portugal and Turkey)31.    
 
31. Note that the lack of representativeness of country leaders in renewable technologies, such as Denmark, 
raises concerns about the reliability of USPTO patents in measuring green competencies. Moreover, this does not 
consent us a full comparison between the result with USPTO and the ones with EPO patents.  Also, with USPTO 
we have data only until 2000 as citations for more recent patents are limited.  
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Results in Tables 11 and 12 show the effect of our variables of interest on patent count (odd columns) 
and patent citations (even columns).  Tables 12 also displays extended specifications that control for 
GDP per capita (as a surrogate for the policy index), political variables and Kyoto dummy. In all these 
specifications, a broad picture emerges: the impact of each variable substantially changes when we 
consider the citation weighted number of patents rather than mere patent counts. Interestingly, product 
market regulation turns out being particularly more effective on high quality patents, partially 
challenging the concerns by Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) on the effect of liberalization on radical 
innovations. In particular, the effect of PMR reaches around 1.2 if only top 20% patents are 
considered. However, results might be driven by the US and by the low reliability of US patents in 
capturing effective competencies in green technologies. Also, other variables have a significantly 
higher impact on citations: R&D, inequality and the knowledge-related measures, especially 
knowledge diversity whose effect almost doubles. With regards of the policies, Kyoto, trade 
certificates and investment incentives have both a significantly larger effect on green citations. In line 
with theoretical research (e.g. Jaffe and Stavins 1995, Jaffe et al. 2003, Fisher and Newell 2008), 
obligations appear to affect negatively high quality innovation as they do not provide an incentive to 
go beyond regulation.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on determinants of environmental innovations in two 
ways. First, we provide a careful evaluation of the impact of liberalization of the energy market on 
renewable energy technologies. In particular, we show that lowering product market regulation can 
have a significant positive impact on renewable energy technologies. This effect is consistent with 
several case studies, which show that lowering entry barriers is more beneficial to green innovation 
than the promotion of private ownership. We also find that deregulation fosters innovation 
significantly more when the initial level of R&D is sufficiently high and the initial share of energy 
produced by DG. A more ambitious environmental regulation is also more effective when combined 
with lower entry barriers, promoting the entry of new players into the market. Still, an apparently 
optimal combination of ambitious environmental policies and liberalized energy markets remains 
fairly risky for the asymmetric degree of commitment associated with the two policies: very high for 
liberalization, very low for environmental policies that are more sensitive to electoral cycles. A major 
concern is the recent trends of market integration in EU countries that have brought about excessive 
concentration with few large players dominating the market, e.g. EDF, ENI, E-ON, Vattenfall.This 
process may undermine the entry of new innovative players and the development of the DG paradigm. 
Whether preventing entry has a positive or a negative impact on innovation, depends crucially on the 
stage of development of the renewable energy industry. 
Second, we show that the impact of policies might be underestimated in fixed effect Poisson 
regressions with respect to GMM ones. GMM estimates suggest that the effect of GDP per capita on 
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innovation is fully mediated by its effect on the approval of more ambitious policies. In turn, income 
inequality does not affect substantially environmental policies, but lowering inequality positively 
impacts innovation, especially in technologies where consumers’ involvement is more important, i.e. 
solar. Our results are robust to various specifications, notably adding technology-specific effects and 
variables of political context. Using more sophisticated measures of the knowledge stock and 
considering quality-adjusted patents reinforces our results. In this case, entry barriers and inequality 
keep having a relevant effect only on high-quality patents, while the effect of knowledge diversity 
almost doubles when citations are considered.  
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Appendix A- Descriptive Stats and Additional Information 
A1. Data sources 
Key variables 
• Entry barrier, time-varying indicator of Product Market Regulation (Oecd). 
• Inequality, Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
• Synthetic indicator of environmental policy (IEA, and other sources) 
• Knowledge stock weighted by citations (USPTO) 
• Knowledge diversity –number of tech. field- conditioned to the number of patents (USPTO)  
Basic controls
• Total patent activity (Oecd) 
• Current and past electricity prices (IEA, International Energy Agency) 
• Current and past R&D in renewable energy (IEA) 
• Population  
Additional controls
• Index of country political instability (Comparative Political Data Set I) 
• Woman participation in parliament (Comparative Political Data Set I) 
• Share of tertiary educated (Cohen and Soto dataset) 
• Share of people  above 65 (Comparative Political Data Set I) 
• Perception of Corruption (world resource institute dataset)  
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Table 1: list of variables and descriptive statistics 
Acronim Description Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
EPO 3 Total Renewable patents at EPO 
(EPO 3); i.e. Wind, Solar Thermal, 
Solar Photovoltaic, Solar thermal 
hybrids, Geothermal, Marine energy, 
Hydro new (e.g. Tidal),  Hydro 
Conventional, Biofuel 
1008 10.402 28.41 0 350.5 
EPO 2 Total Renewable patents at EPO 
(EPO 2); i.e.  EPO3 plus Energy 
from non-fossil fuel. 
1008 10.940 29.594 0 366.5 
Solar 
Photovoltaic 
Patent at EPO 1008 3.976 14.391 0 143 
Solar thermal Patent at EPO 1008 1.630 4.092 0 52 
PV Patent at EPO 1008 .0962 .40005 0 5 
Wind Patent at EPO 1008 1.627 6.253 0 79 
Hydro energy 
Conventional 
Patent at EPO 1008 .5982 1.571 0 24 
Population  Habitants/1000 1008 35245.1 50897.7 339.17 295753 
Total Patent Total patent at EPO 1008 1854.85 4819.46 0 35569.95 
R&D (Ren.) Total RD&D in Million USD (2010 
prices and PPP) 617 51.324 130.52 .008 1560.916 
Energy Prices Energy end use price, USDppp/unit 
(Households) 813 .108 .046 .019 .256 
Policy Index Standardized in the analyses 1008 .23041 .2416 0 1 
PMR Electr. Standardized in the analyses 791 .4709 .178 .074 1 
Gini coeff. Standardized in the analyses 957 28.974 6.625 15.061 53.922 
Government 
Chan. 
Number of changes in government 
per year; termination of government 
due to (a) elections, (b) resignation 
of the Prime Minister, (c) dissension 
within government, (d) lack of 
parliamentary support, (e) 
intervention by the head of state. 
775     
Political 
Instability 
Political instability index, moving 
average over previous five years of 
the number of government change 
characterized by a significant 
ideological gap 
721 -.0001 .455 -3 3 
Goverment Type Type of Government. Classification: 
(1) single party majority (2) minimal 
winning coalition (3) surplus 
coalition (4) single party minority 
(5) multi party minority (6) caretaker 
government  
730 2.436 1.276 1 6 
Elderly Log % population 65 and over  787 2.5828 .188 1.955 3.003 
Education Log  % pop. aged 15 or over with 
complete higher education 1008 .103 .071 0 .285 
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A2. Patent classes 
Table 2: renewable energy patents 
Class Brief Descriptions 
Wind energy Wind currents can be used to generate electricity by using wing-shaped rotors to convert kinetic energy from the 
wind into mechanical energy and a generator to convert the resulting mechanical energy into electricity. 
Solar thermal 
energy 
Heat captured from the sun is used for residential heating or industrial processes or for thermal power generation. 
Technologies involved in solar thermal energy production include solar heat collection, heat storage, systems 
control, and system design technologies 
Solar photovoltaic 
(PV) energy 
Specially adapted semiconductor devices are used to convert solar radiation into electrical current. Related 
technologies include solar cell design, storage battery, and power conversion technologies. 
Geothermal 
energy 
Thermal energy derived from magma heat and stored in soil, underground water, or surface water can be used for 
heating or cooling buildings by means of a ground coupled heat pump system. Such systems operate by having a 
heat exchange embedded in a borehole supply the energy for the evaporation and condensation of a refrigerant. 
Geothermal liquid can also be used to drive turbines and thus generate electricity. 
Marine energy 
(excluding tidal) 
Energy From waves. 
Hydro energy - 
tidal, stream or 
damless 
The energy from incoming and outgoing tides can be harnessed togenerate electricity using, for instance, turbines. 
Hydro energy – 
conventional 
Electricity can be generated through the conversion of potential energy of water 
contained in a reservoir using a turbine and a generator. 
Biofuels Bioenergy generally refers to energy produced from biomass, that is to say organic matter including dedicated 
energy crops and trees, agricultural food and feed crops, agricultural crop wastes and residues, wood wastes and 
residues, aquatic plants, animalwastes, municipal wastes, and other waste materials.  
Fuel from waste 
(e.g. methane) 
Household and other waste can be processed into liquid or solid fuels or burned directly to produce heat that can 
then be used for power generation (“mass burn”). Refuse derived fuel (RDF) is a solid fuel obtained by shredding 
or treating municipal waste in an autoclave, removing non-combustible elements, drying, and finally shaping the 
product. It has high energy content and can be used as fuel for power generation or for boilers. 
Source: WIPO.  Patent Based Technology analysis Report. 
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A3. Policy Index 
Table 3: further details on the components of the policy index 
The policy index used in this analysis is based on a Data base on public policy aimed at supporting renewable energy adoption developed 
by the International Energy Agency, and summarized in the table below.  
 
Instrument Brief explanation Variable Construction 
Investment incentives Capital Grants and all other measures aimed at reducing the capital 
cost of adopting renewable energy technologies. May also take the 
form of third party financial arrangements, where central 
governments assume part of the risk or provide low interest rate on 
loans. They generally provided by State budgets. 
A dummy variable that takes on a value 
of 0 prior to introduction of the policy, and 1 
thereafter 
Tax Measure Used either to encourage production or discourage consumption. 
They may have the form of investment tax credit or property tax 
exemptions, in order to reduce tax payments for project owner. An 
example is the US production Tax credit for wind (1992). Excises are 
not directly accounted here unless they were explicitly created to 
promote renewables (for example excise tax exemptions). 
A dummy variable that takes on a value 
of 0 prior to introduction of the policy, and 1 
thereafter 
Incentive tariff Guaranteed price systems that guarantee above market tariff rates. 
In such cases, the Environmental authority generally sets a premium 
price to be paid for power generated from renewables 
A dummy 0-1 
 
Feed-in Tariff Guaranteed price that may vary by technology Feed-in tariff Level. 
Voluntary program One of the first voluntary program was in Denmark in 1984, when 
utilities agreed to buy 100MW of wind power. These programs 
generally operate through agreement between government, public 
utilities and energy suppliers. 
A dummy variable that takes on a value 
of 0 prior to introduction of the policy, and 1 
thereafter 
Obbligation Obligation are generally quota systems that place an obligation on 
suppliers to provide a share of their energy supply from renewable 
energy. 
A dummy 0-1 
 
Tradable Certificate Renewable energy Certificates (RECs), are generally used to track 
or document compliance with quota system. At national level part of 
the total electricity produced generally must be generated by 
renewables or covered with a renewable energy certificate. 
A dummy 0-1 
 
Research and 
Development Support 
Public financed R&D program  A dummy 0-1. In this case a second dummy has 
been created for these countries that implemented a 
second R&D program.  
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Figure 1: patterns of policy adoption 
 
 
Figure 2: correlation GDP-WTP for environmental quality (Eurobarometer) 
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Figure 3: Policy Index 
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Figure 4: trends in the policy index, selected countries 
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Figure 5: trends in the policy index, selected countries 
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Table 4 
Determinants of the Policy Index    
Variable  Only best instrument 
Only 2' best 
instrument role of inequality
Both best 
instruments 
Variables pol. 
Context 
Adoption lead 14.7875   10.8762 9.5313 
 0.4765   0.4831 0.6691 
GDP pc(t-1)  0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
inequality   0.229   
   0.026   
gov. change     0.0107 
     0.008 
kyoto     0.21 
      0.0157 
constant -0.0302 -0.1202 -1.6045 -0.1965 -0.0714 
  0.01 0.0153 0.0658 0.0128 0.0182 
N 1008 943 898 943 756 
R^2 0.4886 0.4181 0.4689 0.6216 0.7041 
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A4. Energy Markets and Liberalization 
Table 5 
Energy markets before liberalization 
Country Share of DG before liberalization 
Non monopoly 
system before 
liberalization 
Australia 0 0 
Austria 1 1 
Belgium 0 1 
Canada 0 0 
Czech Republic 1/2 1 
Denmark 2 1 
Finland 0 1 
France 0 0 
Germany 2 1 
Greece 0 0 
Hungary 0 1 
Ireland 0 0 
Italy 0 0 
Japan 0/1 0 
Luxembourg 0 1 
Mexico 0 0 
Netherlands 2 1 
New Zealand 1 1 
Norway 0 1 
Poland 1 1 
Portugal 1 0 
Slovak Republic 0 1 
Spain 1 0 
Sweden 2 1 
Switzerland 0 1 
Turkey 0 1 
United Kingdom 0 0 
United States 0 0 
DG=Distributed generation, 2 is high share, 0 low 
Monopoly before liberal.: 0 no, 1 yes, shadow: difficult to classify 
Sources: IEA country reviews, IEA 'Lesson from lib. Mkt.' Glanchant 
and Finon (2003) 
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Figure 6: trends in PMR, selected countries 
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Figure 7: trends in PMR, selected countries 
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A5. Measuring knowledge stock and knowledge diversity 
The knowledge base of a given country can be described by means of systematic attributes. First, we 
measure knowledge capital of country  at time based on Popp (2003) as follows: 
, where  is the rate of knowledge obsolescence,  
captures knowledge diffusion and is the number of patents applied for by firm  in year . In our 
work, we set the rate ofknowledge obsolescence to , and the rate of knowledge 
diffusion to  . An alternative method is the so-called permanent inventory method, 
and measures the cumulated stock of past patent applications as follows: 
, where again  is the rate of knowledge obsolescence set to . 
For both measures we expect a positive impact of accumulated knowledge on patent production. 
Importantly, patent statistics provide information on technology classes in which firms develop 
technological competencies. This information is essential in experimenting for the expected positive role of 
knowledge diversity on patent generation. Diversity affects output by increasing the number of new 
knowledge combinations, that is, the potential number of innovations. However, not all innovations arise 
from radical new knowledge. Cross fertilisation processes arise when new basic knowledge about the 
principles at work in a given scientific fieldbecome correspondingly relevant in other research areas. We 
state that internal knowledge spillovers, i.e. knowledge flows amongst different research programmes 
conducted within a single country, contribute significantly to innovative performance.  
We measure knowledge diversity as follows. Let be the number of patents applied for by 
country  at time  in patent technology class . In order to compensate for changes in a countries 
technological policy, we introduce some rigidity in its set of technological competencies and define 
as the sum of all patent applications over the past five years: . Now let 
, if the country has developed competencies in patent technology class , ,  
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otherwise. Knowledge diversity  is simply the number of patent technology classes in which firms 
develop scientific competencies: , over the past five years. 
Appendix B- Tables of results 
Table 6: All Renewables. Dependent variable: Renewable EPO Patents 
Specification I II III IV V VI 
Population 0.0001** 
(4.48e-06) 
0.0001** 
(5.78e-06) 
0.0001*** 
(4.24e-06) 
0.0001** 
(5.85e-06) 
0.00001** 
(5.79e-06) 
0.0001*** 
5.89e-06 
Log Total Patent 0.5182** 
(0.249) 
0.5068** 
(0.227) 
0.8452*** 
(0.152) 
0.5636** 
(0.220) 
0.4176** 
(0.198) 
0.2598 
0.213 
Log R&D (Ren.) 0.3879*** 
(0.061) 
0.3607*** 
(0.054) 
0.1654*** 
(0.049) 
0.3953*** 
(0.063) 
0.3379*** 
(0.062) 
0.2827*** 
0.040 
Log Past R&D (Ren.) 0.0382 
(0.120) 
0.0948 
(0.081) 
0.1499*** 
(0.053) 
0.0661 
(0.066) 
0.1202* 
(0.074) 
0.1187** 
0.054 
Log Energy Prices 11.507*** 
(4.196) 
7.934** 
(3.851) 
5.6539** 
(2.524) 
4.8395* 
(2.633) 
8.8126** 
(3.717) 
5.6522* 
3.066 
Log Past En. Prices -14.277* 
(7.706) 
-12.986** 
(6.029) 
-3.7999 
(4.008) 
-10.713** 
(4.961) 
-12.657** 
(5.729) 
-8.7103** 
4.405 
Policy Index (Std)  0.3986*** 
(0.080) 
0.3355*** 
(0.084) 
0.2307*** 
(0.064) 
 0.2473*** 
(0.090) 
0.2348*** 
0.076 
PMR Electr. (Std)  -0.351*** 
(0.1003) 
-0.252*** 
(0.079) 
 
 
-0.2888*** 
(0.106) 
-0.336*** 
0.094 
Gini coeff. (Std)  -.3152 
(0.208) 
-0.2029* 
(0.121) 
-0.332*** 
(0.211) 
-0.2322 
(0.216) 
-0.5629** 
0.256 
Policy Indext-1     0.3175*** 
(0.075) 
  
PMR Electr.t-1    
 
 -0.398*** 
(0.106) 
  
 
Kyoto Dummy      0.3310*** 
(0.093) 
0.2922*** 
0.085 
Government Chan.      0.0947** 
0.037 
Political Instability      -0.1620* 
0.089 
Goverment Type      0.0867 
0.062 
Log Elderly      0.6376 
0.464 
Log Education      2.3999 
2.005 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No No 
Observation 567 543 543 542 543 490 
Log likelihood -1679.76 -1568.43 -1411.41 -1561.16 -1542.66 -1427.55 
 1.3e+05 52040.21 1.8e+05 48870.93 44801.81 2.2e+06 
Dependent variable: Total Renewable patents at EPO (EPO 3); i.e. Wind energy, Solar Thermal energy, Solar 
Photovoltaic energy, Solar thermal (PV) hybrids, Geothermal energy, Marine energy, Hydro Energy (Tidal, Stream or 
Dameless),  Hydro energy Conventional, Biofuel. 
Poisson Estimations, cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis. Cluster unit: Country 
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 7: All Renewables. Dep. variable: Renewable EPO Patents. PMR & Interactions 
Specification I II III IV V 
Population 0.0001*** 
(4.27e-06) 
0.0001*** 
(4.36e-06) 
0.0001*** 
(4.17e-06) 
0.0001* 
(3.96e-06) 
0.0001** 
(4.33e-06) 
Log Total Patent 0.485** 
(0.236) 
0.4873*** 
(0.228) 
0.5220** 
(0.234) 
0.505** 
(0.227) 
0.488** 
(0.235) 
Log R&D (Ren.) 0.3538*** 
(0.053) 
0.376*** 
(0.0604) 
0.3946*** 
(0.061) 
0.338*** 
(0.065) 
0.3558*** 
(0.055) 
Log Past R&D (Ren.) 0.1091 
(0.101) 
0.1138 
(0.106) 
0.1265 
(0.101) 
0.1189 
(0.092) 
0.0839 
(0.103) 
Log Energy Prices 9.196*** 
(3.535) 
6.301 
(3.949) 
5.9967 
(4.097) 
7.364*** 
(2.471) 
8.5025** 
(3.49) 
Log Past En. Prices -14.072** 
(6.006) 
-12.776** 
(5.601) 
-13.245** 
(5.35) 
-11.129** 
(5.079) 
-13.373** 
(5.451) 
Policy Index (Std) 0.2968*** 
(0.079) 
0.276*** 
(0.077) 
0.2693*** 
(0.081) 
0.0110 
(0.11) 
0.2867*** 
(0.072) 
PMR Electr. (Std) -0.3323*** 
(0.112) 
-0.271*** 
(0.071) 
0.1140 
(0.172) 
-0.2007*** 
(0.058) 
 
DG * (1-PMR)  0.133** 
(0.064) 
   
R&D * (1-PMR)   0.2209** 
(0.092) 
  
Policy*(1-PMR)    0.1383*** 
(0.042) 
 
PMR entry     -0.0416* 
(0.024) 
PMR public owned     -0.0389 
(0.046) 
PMR vertical integration     -0.0565 
(0.036) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No 
Observation 550 550 550 550 567 
Log likelihood -1610.74 -1596.1 -1595.17 -1575.36 -1620.65 
 54924.62 1.0e+05 1.2e+05 2.1e+05 77238.11 
Dependent variable: Total Renewable patents at EPO (EPO 3); i.e. Wind energy, Solar Thermal energy, Solar 
Photovoltaic energy, Solar thermal (PV) hybrids, Geothermal energy, Marine energy, Hydro Energy (Tidal, Stream or 
Dameless),  Hydro energy Conventional, Biofuel. 
Poisson Estimations, cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis. Cluster unit: Country 
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 8: Renewable Energy Technologies Separated. Dep. variable: Renewable EPO Patents 
Specification Solar 
Photovoltaic 
Solar thermal  PV Wind  Hydro energy 
Conventional 
Population -0.0001** 
(7.07e-06) 
0.0001** 
(4.80e-06) 
0.0001** 
0.00001 
0.0001*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0001*** 
(8.32e-06) 
Log Total Patent 0.9810*** 
(0.328) 
0.18481 
(0.119) 
-0.4728 
0.633 
0.5463 
(0.372) 
0.5717*** 
(0.187) 
Log R&D (Field) 0.2817*** 
(0.067) 
0.5378*** 
(0.108) 
0.9224*** 
0.262 
0.0975 
(0.140) 
0.3584** 
(0.179) 
Log Past R&D (Field) 0.0401 
(0.088) 
-0.1192 
(0.129) 
-0.4909 
0.346 
-0.0555 
(0.090) 
0.0896 
(0.1046) 
Log Energy Prices 7.8367*** 
(2.849) 
13.3042*** 
(4.281) 
-8.3458 
18.754 
5.703 
(3.525) 
7.6997 
(7.7020) 
Log Past En. Prices -5.698 
(4.967) 
-22.1288*** 
(5.059) 
45.819** 
21.91 
-13.499 
(9.321) 
-14.693 
(10.185) 
Policy Index (Std) 0.2460*** 
(0.081) 
0.1054 
(0.072) 
0.4277*** 
0.15 
0.7099*** 
(0.156) 
0.1767 
(0.119) 
PMR Electr. (Std) -0.2027** 
(0.103) 
-0.6483*** 
(0.139) 
0.0044 
0.417 
-0.4664* 
(0.278) 
-0.2654** 
(0.137) 
Gini coeff. (Std) -0.277** 
(0.143) 
-0.6020*** 
(0.190) 
-1.190** 
0.607 
-0.9924* 
(0.567) 
-0.3091 
(0.488) 
Policy No Denmark 0.246*** 
(0.082) 
0.1345* 
(0.071) 
0.4277*** 
(0.150) 
0.8264*** 
(0.139) 
0.1915 
(0.117) 
PMR No Denmark -0.2007** 
(0.103) 
-0.5963*** 
(0.132) 
0.0044 
(0.417) 
-0.1868 
(0.202) 
-0.2338* 
(0.140) 
Gini No Denmark -0.2771** 
(0.143) 
-0.5156*** 
(0.184) 
-1.190** 
(0.607) 
-0.3620 
(0.465) 
-0.2566 
(0.505) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No 
Observation 419 525 319 477 508 
Log likelihood -653.44 -741.80 -115.82 -730.21 -499.66 
 62976.03 1184.69 7052.43 32009.18 6376.08 
Poisson Estimations, cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis. Cluster unit: Country 
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 9: Technology Fixed Effect Model. Dependent variable: Renewable EPO Patents 
Specification I II III IV V VI VII 
Population 0.0001** 
(6.34e-06) 
0.0001* 
(6.47e-06) 
0.0001* 
(5.93e-06) 
0.0001* 
(5.54e-06) 
0.0001 
(5.72e-06) 
0.0001*** 
(5.46e-06) 
0.0001** 
(4.47e-06) 
Log Total Patent 0.5389*** 
(0.1702) 
0.8174*** 
(0.158) 
0.4482** 
(0.181) 
0.509*** 
(0.163) 
0.5403*** 
(0.177) 
0.5263*** 
(0.127) 
0.4170*** 
(0.136) 
Log R&D (Field) 0.42107*** 
(0.1088) 
0.2179** 
(0.092) 
0.4045*** 
(0.113) 
0.4034*** 
(0.116) 
0.3993*** 
(0.117) 
0.4476*** 
(0.1008) 
0.3724*** 
(0.082) 
Log Past R&D (Field) -0.0479 
(0.037) 
-0.0564* 
(0.032) 
-0.0055 
(0.035) 
-0.0033 
(0.036) 
-0.0150 
(0.038) 
-0.0526 
(0.033) 
-0.033 
(0.036) 
Log Past R&D (Ren.) -0.0073 
(0.092) 
0.0781 
(0.064) 
0.0318 
(0.104) 
0.0191 
(0.103) 
0.0241 
(0.104) 
0.0309 
(0.097) 
0.0298 
(0.076) 
Log Energy Prices 6.2168** 
(3.412) 
6.0828** 
(2.773) 
7.8409** 
(3.867) 
7.174** 
(3.699) 
5.5372* 
(3.298) 
4.7385 
(3.265) 
7.512*** 
(2.769) 
Log Past En. Prices -11.955*** 
(3.891) 
-4.7698 
(3.350) 
-12.264*** 
(4.187) 
-12.702*** 
(4.314) 
-10.602** 
(4.150) 
-7.4038** 
(3.801) 
-10.916*** 
(3.337) 
Policy Index (Std) 0.3623*** 
(0.0748) 
0.2026** 
(0.098) 
0.3179*** 
(0.071) 
0.3006*** 
(0.069) 
0.1142 
(0.088) 
 -0.1351* 
(0.074) 
PMR electr. (Std) -0.3827*** 
(0.0972) 
-0.2709*** 
(0.100) 
-0.3331*** 
(0.081) 
-0.4402** 
(0.230) 
-0.1939** 
(0.079) 
-0.3233*** 
(0.092) 
-0.3127*** 
(0.079) 
Gini coeff. (Std) -0.4552** 
(0.1863) 
-0.3261** 
(0.171) 
   -0.2503 
(0.189) 
-0.4223*** 
(0.119) 
DG * (1-PMR)   0.1227 
(0.134) 
    
R&D * (1-PMR)    -0.0512 
(0.119) 
   
Policy * (1-PMR)     0.1239*** 
(0.029) 
  
Feed in Level (Field)      0.8468** 
(0.366) 
 
Share of REC      -0.0023 
(0.021) 
 
Tax      0.5129*** 
(0.187) 
 
Incentive Investment      -0.0360 
(0.101) 
 
Voluntary Program      -0.0467 
(0.158) 
 
Obligation      0.4061*** 
(0.131) 
 
Kyoto       0.3971*** 
(0.088) 
Wind * policy       0.7448*** 
(0.086) 
PV * policy       0.4749*** 
(0.046) 
Geothermal * policy       0.1914*** 
(0.060) 
Hydro * policy       0.3289*** 
(0.106) 
Marine * policy       0.3769** 
(0.154) 
Biofuel * policy       0.4011*** 
(0.102) 
Techn * Cnt FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No No No No No 
Area trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 3563 3563 3608 3608 3608 3563 3563 
Log likelihood -4414.05 -4278.17 -4497.63 -4500.16 -4488.51 -4386.21 -4154.66 
 712.03 1450.91 605.57 481.59 626.83 944.75 3322.97 
Poisson Estimations, cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis. Cluster unit: Country*technology 
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 10: Endogenous Policy Index, FE GMM Poisson. Dep. Variable: Renewable EPO Pat 
Specification I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Population 0.0001*** 
(5.04e-06) 
0.0001*** 
(2.39e-06) 
0.0001***
(2.53e-06)
0.0001***
(5.14e-06)
0.0001***
(2.66e-06)
0.0001*** 
(3.71e-06) 
0.0001*** 
(2.16e-06) 
0.0001***
(2.07e-06)
Log Total 
Patent 
0.3376 
(0.245) 
0.5622*** 
(0.155) 
0.6045***
(0.105) 
0.3667 
(0.257) 
0.7524***
(0.175)
0.9099*** 
(0.155) 
0.6730*** 
(0.155) 
0.6259***
(0.138) 
Log R&D (Ren.) 0.2920*** 
(0.092) 
0.3616*** 
(0.053) 
0.3241***
(0.074) 
0.3042***
(0.110) 
0.4168***
(0.080) 
0.4017*** 
(0.072) 
0.4135*** 
(0.084) 
0.4343***
(0.074) 
Log Past R&D 
(Ren.) 
0.1247 
(0.080) 
0.2049*** 
(0.058) 
0.1206***
(0.044) 
0.1193 
(0.091) 
0.2505***
(0.063) 
0.1117** 
(0.056) 
0.2590*** 
(0.069) 
0.2994***
(0.079) 
Log Energy 
Prices 
6.0483 
(4.937) 
6.704* 
(3.824) 
5.0600* 
(2.906) 
6.3664 
(5.435) 
5.6977 
(4.265) 
5.725* 
(3.275) 
4.4331 
(4.407) 
1.4902 
(5.171) 
Log Past En. 
Prices 
-11.702* 
(7.061) 
-15.76*** 
(4.849) 
-13.75***
(3.839) 
-11.907* 
(7.187) 
-16.52***
(5.440) 
-15.97*** 
(5.663) 
-14.76*** 
(5.154) 
-13.31***
(4.571) 
Policy Index  0.5287*** 
(0.181) 
0.2792*** 
(0.075) 
0.2608***
(0.074) 
0.4942** 
(0.227) 
0.2190***
(0.075) 
0.1360** 
(0.071) 
0.2153*** 
(0.078) 
0.2233***
(0.086) 
PMR Electr.  -0.24** 
(0.125) 
-0.609*** 
(0.125) 
-.4432***
(0.086) 
-0.2599* 
(0.156) 
-.6108***
(0.133) 
-.4432*** 
(0.081) 
-0.462*** 
(0.101) 
0.3607 
(0.2086) 
Gini coefficient -.4479** 
(0.232) 
-.5355*** 
(0.198) 
-.4833***
(0.150) 
-.4240* 
(0.250) 
-.5940***
(0.191) 
-.4958*** 
(0.155) 
-0.445*** 
(0.165) 
-0.3695**
(0.151) 
Lagged Depend. 
Var. 
  0.0024***
(0.0008) 
  0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
  
DG * (1-PMR)       0.1478*** 
(0.064) 
 
R&D * (1-PMR)        0.4213***
(0.105) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 544 524 524 544 524 524 524 524 
GMM criterion 1.228e-26 0.0135 0.0103 4.737e-26 0.01417 0.0107 0.0135 0.0122 
Hansen test 1.00 0.2136 0.3639 1.00 0.1150 0.2297 
 
0.1318 0.1696 
Instruments Adoption 
Lead 
Kyoto, one 
year lag 
GDP, two 
year lag 
GDP, 
Adoption 
Lead, Gov. 
Change  
Kyoto, one 
year lag 
GDP, two 
year lag 
GDP, 
Adoption 
Lead, Gov. 
Change 
one year 
lag GDP 
Kyoto, one 
year lag 
GDP, two 
year lag 
GDP, Gov. 
Change  
Kyoto, one 
year lag 
GDP, two 
year lag 
GDP, Gov. 
Change 
Kyoto, one 
year lag 
GDP, two 
year lag 
GDP, Gov. 
Change 
Kyoto, one 
year lag 
GDP, two 
year lag 
GDP, Gov. 
Change 
Dependent variable: Columns I, II, III, IV: Total Renewable patents at EPO (EPO 3); i.e. Wind energy, Solar 
Thermal energy, Solar Photovoltaic energy, Solar thermal (PV) hybrids, Geothermal energy, Marine energy, Hydro 
Energy (tidal, Stream or Dameless),  Hydro energy Conventional, Biofuel. 
Poisson Estimations, cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis. Cluster unit: Country. 
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 11: Quality of Patents. Dependent Variable: Renewable USPTO Patents 
Specification I II III IV 
Dependent Variable Patent Counts Green Citations Patent Counts 
(Without outliers & 
Denmark) 
Green Citations 
(Without outliers & 
Denmark) 
Know. Stock (std) 0.0858*** 
(0.020) 
0.1265*** 
(0.048) 
0.0874*** 
(0.020) 
0.1293*** 
(0.049) 
Green Know. (std) 0.2890*** 
(0.0790) 
0.4676*** 
(0.170) 
0.2916*** 
(0.074) 
0.4629*** 
(0.171) 
Know. Diver. (std) 0.0790*** 
(0.023) 
0.1644*** 
(0.048) 
0.0837*** 
(0.024) 
0.1613*** 
(0.049) 
Population -0.0001** 
(7.63e-06) 
2.15e-06 
(0.00001) 
-.0001*** 
(6.78e-06) 
2.66e-06 
(0.00001) 
Log R&D (Ren.) 0.0881 
(0.086) 
0.2893*** 
(0.093) 
0.0746 
(0.090) 
0.2848*** 
(0.092) 
Log Past R&D (Ren.) -0.1193* 
(0.064) 
-0.3531*** 
(0.053) 
-0.1113* 
(0.065) 
-0.356*** 
(0.054) 
Log Energy Prices 0.0586 
(4.960) 
1.986 
(6.615) 
-1.0871 
(5.181) 
2.0257 
(6.648) 
Log Past En. Prices 4.5056 
(7.347) 
7.244 
(9.683) 
4.0703 
(7.823) 
7.8008 
(9.795) 
PMR electr. (Std) -0.1243 
(0.114) 
-0.6544*** 
(0.207) 
-0.1093 
(0.115) 
-0.648*** 
(0.2094) 
Gini coeff. (Std) 0.2566 
(0.315) 
-0.5984 
(0.423) 
0.3224 
(0.313) 
-0.6143 
(0.429) 
Time trend -0.057*** 
(0.017) 
-0.0757*** 
(0.021) 
-0.056*** 
(0.018) 
-0.076*** 
(0.021) 
Feed in Level (Average) -1.8403 
(1.596) 
-4.8006 
(3.164) 
-1.8118 
(1.705) 
-4.8591 
(3.154) 
Dummy R&D Plan -0.7013 
(0.542) 
-1.0179 
(0.768) 
-0.608 
(0.559) 
-1.069 
(0.775) 
Dummy R&D Grant 0.5005*** 
(0.121) 
0.4933** 
(0.240) 
0.5314*** 
(0.132) 
0.4850** 
(0.241) 
Trade Certificate 0.4054* 
(0.228) 
1.1735** 
(0.490) 
0.5370** 
(0.222) 
1.1702** 
(0.519) 
Tax 0.1203 
(0.091) 
0.0255 
(0.111) 
0.0914 
(0.092) 
0.012 
(0.107) 
Investment Incentive 0.1280** 
(0.064) 
0.1672*** 
(0.055) 
0.1486** 
(0.063) 
0.1683*** 
(0.056) 
Economic incentive 0.1426 
(0.134) 
0.5163*** 
(0.157) 
0.1665 
(0.133) 
0.5371*** 
(0.152) 
Voluntary Program 0.0761 
(0.060) 
0.1432 
(0.143) 
0.0825 
(0.057) 
0.1437 
(0.144) 
Obligation 0.2584 
(0.165) 
-0.6728* 
(0.385) 
0.1778 
(0.160) 
-0.6740* 
(0.404) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No 
Observation 434 361 351 338 
Log likelihood -640.865 -703.30 -597.70 -691.84 
 4.2e+09 7.6e+15 1.5e+16 -1.0e+17 
Dependent variable: Patent count at USPTO, Citations in green patent  
Poisson Estimations, cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis. Cluster unit: Country 
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level 
 
 
 
  43
Francesco Vona, Francesco Nicolli and Lionel Nesta 
Table 12: Quality of Patents. Dependent Variable: Renewable USPTO Patents - II 
Specification V VI VII VIII 
Dependent Variable Patent Counts (no 
outliers & Denmark)
Green Citations (no 
outliers & Denmark)
Patent Counts (no 
outliers & Denmark) 
Green Citations (no 
outliers & Denmark)
Know. Stock (std) 0.0905*** 
(0.023) 
0.1411*** 
(0.0405) 
0.1415*** 
(0.041) 
0.1750*** 
(0.055) 
Green Know. (std) 0.3358*** 
(0.076) 
0.6173*** 
(0.156) 
0.0290 
(0.109) 
0.3579 
(0.267) 
Know. Diver. (std) 0.1308*** 
(0.031) 
0.3167*** 
(0.053) 
0.0437 
(0.032) 
0.2235*** 
(0.072) 
Population -0.0001** 
(6.16e-06) 
0.00001* 
(8.45e-06) 
0.00002** 
(0.00001) 
0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
Log R&D (Ren.) 0.0892 
(0.110) 
0.3339*** 
(0.119) 
0.1551 
(0.107) 
0.4405*** 
(0.111) 
Log Past R&D (Ren.) -0.1133 
(0.073) 
-0.347*** 
(0.071) 
-0.1150 
(0.080) 
-0.388*** 
(0.076) 
Log Energy Prices 0.7049 
(6.188) 
6.8474 
(8.160) 
5.6380 
(8.129) 
17.541 
(11.985) 
Log Past En. Prices 3.2362 
(8.302) 
6.087 
(8.866) 
4.8311 
(10.207) 
3.9009 
(8.391) 
PMR electr. (Std) -0.1032 
(0.107) 
-0.630*** 
(0.184) 
-0.287*** 
(0.071) 
-0.807*** 
(0.178) 
Gini coeff. (Std) 0.3726 
(0.304) 
-0.3495 
(0.357) 
0.0456 
(0.232) 
-0.7955** 
(0.364) 
Time trend -0.0624** 
(0.029) 
-0.107*** 
(0.038) 
-0.128*** 
(0.026) 
-0.195*** 
(0.032) 
Feed in Level (Average) -1.7182 
(1.466) 
-3.398 
(2.217) 
0.61635 
(0.5071) 
-0.8670 
(1.305) 
Dummy R&D Plan -0.6146 
(0.564) 
-0.9576** 
(0.756) 
-0.9150** 
(0.462) 
-1.158** 
(0.586) 
Dummy R&D Grant 0.5115*** 
(0.127) 
0.4275** 
(0.211) 
0.3488*** 
(0.085) 
0.2936* 
(0.176) 
Trade Certificate 0.4467** 
(0.234) 
0.9188** 
(0.387) 
0.7195*** 
(0.239) 
1.2808*** 
(0.452) 
Tax 0.0942 
(0.094) 
0.0635 
(0.108) 
-0.0593 
(0.107) 
-0.0246 
(0.153) 
Investment Incentive 0.1493** 
(0.067) 
0.1882** 
(0.086) 
0.0826 
(0.057) 
0.1112 
(0.086) 
Economic incentive 0.1299 
(0.117) 
0.3435** 
(0.135) 
0.0935 
(0.082) 
0.3550*** 
(0.122) 
Voluntary Program 0.0503 
(0.068) 
0.0477 
(0.087) 
0.0114 
(0.069) 
-0.0179 
(0.088) 
Obligation 0.1464 
(0.155) 
-0.726** 
(0.371) 
0.2077 
(0.172) 
-0.6518* 
(0.367) 
Log GDP -0.1511 
(0.919) 
-0.1656 
(1.590) 
-0.8053 
(0.978) 
-0.6627 
(1.800) 
Kyoto 0.2509*** 
(0.091) 
0.7899*** 
(0.1808) 
0.1466* 
(0.087) 
0.6756*** 
(0.175) 
Political instability   0.2832*** 
(0.099) 
0.2388 
(0.147) 
Log elderly   3.097*** 
(0.763) 
2.213** 
(1.117) 
Woman Partecipation   0.333*** 
(0.0985) 
0.502*** 
(0.113) 
Log education   -0.3430 
(3.061) 
3.246 
(3.798) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No 
Observation 351 338 347 334 
Log likelihood -595.27 -669.12 -566.64 -645.32 
 3.5e+16 1.0e+18 -2.7e+16 9.9e+15 
Poisson Est., cluster-robust std. err. in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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